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Much of what is produced is not for final consumption. Products that 
are outputs from one process are often inputs in another, and a large 
portion of world trade is conducted in markets for such intermediate 
goods. Protectionist measures for industries producing these commod- 
ities can take different forms. In addition to the usual array of tariffs 
and quotas, domestic content requirements can be imposed. 
When analyzing protection, most authors focus on the domestic price, 
factor use, and output effects of  introducing a particular protective 
measure. Work on models with intermediate goods has followed this 
tradition. Sanyal and Jones (1982), for example, study the effects of 
imposing a tariff on an intermediate good in a general equilibrium con- 
text. In a partial equilibrium framework, Grossman (1981) analyzes the 
effects of domestic content legislation when domestic and foreign inputs 
are perfect substitutes in production. Mussa (1984) considers the pos- 
sibility that domestic and foreign inputs might not be perfect substitutes 
in production. In addition to the case of perfect competition, he ana- 
lyzes the effects of domestic content requirements when monopoly is 
present.  Krishna and Itoh (1988) look at domestic content legislation 
in oligopolistic industries. 
Another possible approach to analyzing protection, which is followed 
in  this chapter, is to explore the effects of changes in economic con- 
ditions once protective policies are in place. Using a general equilibrium 
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framework, this chapter posits a change in a country’s terms of trade 
and contrasts its effects on domestic prices, factor use, and consump- 
tion under four methods of protecting an import-competing sector that 
produces intermediate goods. The four methods of protection are (1) a 
tariff, (2) a quota, (3) a domestic content requirement defined in phys- 
ical  units,  and  (4)  a domestic content requirement  defined  in  value- 
added terms. Although any of these methods can be implemented with 
the goal of protecting a domestic industry, the behavior of the economy 
in the face of changing trading terms depends significantly on which 
protective policy is selected. 
Section 8.1 exposits the general equilibrium model employed. A small 
country is assumed to have two production tiers. The input tier uses an 
industry-specific factor and labor to produce intermediate goods (in- 
puts), while the output tier uses a different industry-specific factor, la- 
bor, and intermediate goods to produce final goods (outputs). Both inputs 
and outputs are traded on world markets. The small country imports 
inputs and exports outputs. Foreign and domestically produced inputs 
are perfect substitutes. Perfect competition is assumed throughout. 
Section 8.2  reports the effects of terms-of-trade changes when pro- 
tectionist measures are imposed. Perhaps the most interesting result is 
how the world and domestic prices of inputs are correlated. When a 
tariff is imposed the two prices, constrained to differ by the constant 
tariff rate, move together. Under a quota, by contrast, a change in the 
world price has no effect on the domestic price (although it does affect 
domestic welfare). When a domestic content requirement  in physical 
units is imposed, the two prices are negatively correlated. Finally, if  a 
domestic content requirement  is implemented  in  value-added  terms, 
the sign of the correlation seems to be ambiguous. 
The results in section 8.2 report only the signs of the various effects. 
It is also interesting to have some feel for what their magnitudes might 
be. Section 8.3 explores a numerical example where the parameter 
values for the assumed Cobb-Douglas production technologies are de- 
rived  from the  1977 input-output  tables published  by  the Survey of 
Current Business. (Of course, the economy examined  in  section 8.3 
should not be construed to be a good representation of the economy 
of the United States.) In addition to reporting the effects of terms-of- 
trade changes on employment and price in the input tier, the tables list 
the welfare effects of those changes in the presence of protection. It 
is shown that the magnitude of the welfare effects of changing trading 
terms depends on which protective measure is in place. 
8.1  A Simple General Equilibrium Model 
Assume that all production  takes place in  two stages. In the first 
stage, labor is combined with  a specific factor to manufacture inter- 235  Trade Restraints and World Market Conditions 
mediate goods called inputs. In the second stage, labor and another 
specific factor are combined with inputs to produce final products called 
outputs. Industries that manufacture inputs comprise the input  tier 
while  industries  that manufacture outputs comprise the output  tier. 
Both inputs and outputs are traded competitively on the world market, 
and the country is sufficiently small that it cannot affect world prices. 
The country imports inputs  and exports outputs. In the interest of 
tractability, differing factor intensities across industries in a given tier 
are ignored. This allows aggregation of the industries within the input 
tier and output tier, respectively, and simplifies  the analysis considerably. 
Let the level of input production be denoted by X,.  Inputs are pro- 
duced using a specific factor, the supply of which is denoted by  V,, 
and labor. Labor is mobile between tiers. The amount of labor employed 
in the input tier is LI. 
Let the level of output production  be denoted by X,.  Outputs are 
manufactured  using a specific factor, the supply of which is denoted 
by V,, inputs, the use of which is denoted by X;, and labor. The amount 
of labor employed in the output tier is Lo. 
The production functions in the input and output tiers are, respectively, 
It  is assumed that f-and  g  are strictly  concave functions exhibiting 
constant returns to scale. Derivatives of the production functions will 
be denoted by subscripts,  for example,  g23 = d2g/dLo  Xi.  It is assumed 
throughout that gZ3  2 0, but most of the results are valid for general 
concave, linear homogenous production functions, and they are all valid 
as long as g23 is not too negative. 
Let outputs be numeraire, so P  is the relative price of inputs do- 
mestically, and P" is the relative price of inputs on world markets. Four 
protectionist  policies will be considered: a tariff, a quota, a domestic 
content requirement  denominated  in physical units (DCP), and a do- 
mestic content requirement denominated in value-added terms (DCV). 
If a tariff is imposed then the domestic price is given by 
(3.T)  P  = (1  + t)P*, 
where t is the tariff rate. If a quota is imposed then imports are con- 
strained as follows: 
(3.Q)  x; -  X,lq, 
where q is the quota level. If a domestic content requirement denom- 
inated in physical units is implemented then the economy must satisfy 
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This says that a fraction, k, of the produced inputs used domestically 
must be manufactured  domestically. Finally, if domestic content leg- 
islation is written in value-added terms then 
(3.DCV) 
that is, domestic factors and inputs must make up at least a fraction,j, 
of value added. 
It  is  assumed throughout  that  firms choose  to exactly fulfill any 
requirements,  so equations (3.Q),  (3.DCP), and  (3.DCV) hold  with 
equality. Firms take all prices as given, and profits are maximized in 
each industry subject to any policy constraints.  Hence, in the input 
tier V,  and L, must solve 
max Pf(V,,L,)  - rlVI - WL,  , 
where r, is the return to the specific factor and w  is the return to labor. 
The first-order conditions require, of course, that 
P*(x;  - X,)  5  (l-j)Xo, 
(4)  rl  = PfdV,,L,),  and 
(5)  w = PfAV,,L,). 
In the output tier the pertinent maximization problem depends on the 
policy restrictions imposed. Let Xi  be the quantity of inputs imported, 
that is, X;'  = XI + Xi, and let r,  be the return to the specific factor 
used in the output tier. Then V,,  Lo, X,,  and Xi  must solve 
max g(VoLo, X;) - r,Vo  - wLo - PX, - P*X; , 
subject to equation (3.T) under a tariff, subject to equation (3.Q) under 
a quota, subject to equation (3.DCP) if a domestic content requirement 
is  imposed  in  physical  units,  and  subject to equation (3.DCV) if  a 
domestic content requirement is imposed in value-added terms. The 
first-order conditions arising from the above maximization problem are 
presented  below. (First-order conditions corresponding to the  same 
factor are given the same equation number along with letters that denote 
the policy being imposed. For example, equation (6.T,Q) is the first- 
order condition for the specific factor in the output tier when either a 
tariff or a quota is imposed while equation (6.DCP) is the first-order 
condition for the same factor when a domestic content requirement in 
physical units is implemented.) 
Under a tariff or a quota the first-order conditions imply 
(6.T,Q)  ro = g,(v,,L,x;), 
(7.T,Q)  w  = g2(Vo,Lo,X2  and 
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Note that in (8.T,Q) the marginal revenue product of inputs is set equal 
to the domestic price of inputs. In the case of a tariff, P  = (1  + t)P 
and the same price is paid for domestic inputs as for foreign inputs. In 
the case of a quota P > P,  but the marginal unit of inputs is purchased 
domestically. 
If a domestic content requirement is legislated in physical units then 
the pertinent first-order conditions imply 
(6.DCP)  ro  = g,(Vo,Lo,X;'), 
(7.DCP)  w  = gz(Vo,Lo,X;'),  and 
(8.DCP)  kP + (1 - k)P = g,(Vo,Lo,  Xg). 
Note that equations (6) and (7) are the same, respectively, under tariffs, 
quotas, and domestic content requirements in physical units. The same 
is nor true for equation (8). This is because under a domestic content 
requirement denoted in physical units, the marginal unit of inputs is 
partially foreign and partially domestically produced. The fraction of 
the marginal unit that is domestically produced is k. (For a fuller dis- 
cussion of these relations see Grossman 1981 .) 
Finally, if a domestic content requirement is denoted in value-added 




ro  = (1  + (1 -  j)[(P - P*)/P]}g,(V,,L,,X;'), 
w  = (1  + (1 -  j)[(P -  P*)/Pl}g2(Vo,Lo,X;'),  and 
(8.DCV)  P  = (1  + (1 -  j)[(P  -  P)/P]}g3(Vo,L,,X;'), 
wherej is the fraction of value added that must be domestically pro- 
duced. Note that all three equations differ from their counterparts for 
the other cases. (For a fuller discussion see Grossman 1981 .) 
To close the model, balanced trade is assumed, that is, 
(9)  x, + P'X,  = x;  + P*X;'  , 
where Xb  is the amount of  the output consumed in the country. Let 
L = L, + Lo be total labor in  the economy. If  L - LI is substituted 
for Lo in the above systems of equations, there result four systems of 
nine equations in the nine unknowns XI,  Xo, X;',  XL,  r,, ro, w, L,, and 
P. (Which nine equations are appropriate depends, of course, on the 
policy that is implemented.) In the next section these systems of equa- 
tions are employed to derive the effects of a change in P  on P, LI,  and 
Xi  when the various protectionist policies are implemented. 238  Val  Eugene Lambson 
8.2  Terms-of-Trade Effects in the Presence of  Protection 
The analysis of tariffs contains no surprises, but a few results are 
presented so they can be contrasted with those that are obtained for 
alternative protectionist measures. With a tariff imposed, the domestic 
and world prices of  inputs are related by  equation (3.T). Obviously, 
then, dPIW > 0. The relationships between the world price and other 
domestic variables  are also easy to ascertain. Combining equations 
(3.T), (9,  and (7.T,Q) yields 
(10) 
Substitute equation (3.T) into equation (8.T,Q) to write 
(1 1) 
Finally, equations (I),  (2),  and (9) imply 
(12) 
Now equations (10)-(12)  constitute a system of three equations in the 
three  unknowns LI,  X;, and X&.  Totally differentiate  all  three with 
respect to P* and solve for dLIIdP*, dx;laP*,  and dXbIdP'.  Then the 
posited properties of  the production functions imply that an increase 
in the world price of inputs when a tariff is in place (or when there is 
no protection  at  all, that  is, when t  =  1)  has the following effects: 
employment of  labor in  the input tier rises (and hence, so does pro- 
duction in the input tier), employment of produced inputs declines, and 
domestic consumption of outputs (i.e., welfare) declines. 
Now consider a quota that restricts the importation of inputs from 
abroad. Although for any tariff there is a quota that will yield equivalent 
protection to the input tier, an increase in the world price of inputs has 
none of  the effects when a quota is in place that it has when a tariff is 
in place except that domestic consumption falls. The reason is that as 
long as the pattern of  trade  is not  reversed, all the margins remain 
unaffected by a world price change because the marginal unit of inputs 
used in  the output tier is domestically produced.  Under a quota, the 
link between the world price and the domestic price of inputs is broken. 
(13) 
In addition, substitute equation (I) into equation (3.Q) to write 
(14) 
Finally, equation (8.T,Q) is reproduced here as equation (15) for the 
reader's  convenience: 
(1 + f)P*f2(V/,L/)  = g,(Vo,L - L,,x;). 
(1 + t)P* = &(V,,L  - L,,x;). 
g(V0,L - L/,x;)  + P*f(V/,L/)  = x;  + x;  . 
Specifically, use equations (5)  and (7.T,Q) to write 
Pf,(V,,L,) = g2(Vo,L - L,,x;). 
x;  -  f(V/,L,) = q. 239  Trade Restraints and World Market Conditions 
(15) 
Now  equations (13)-(15) constitute three equations in  the three un- 
knowns P, X;,  and LI.  Note, however, that these equations are entirely 
independent of P".  Changes in the world price of inputs when there is 
a quota in effect have no effect on domestic production decisions. They 
do, however, affect domestic consumption. Differentiation of the bud- 
get constraint (9) establishes that 
P  = g,(V,,L  -  L/,x;). 
(16)  ax&/ap*  = x,  - x;  < 0. 
Although no production decisions are affected, the price paid for the 
(constant) level of imports increases, resulting in a decrease  in domestic 
consumption of outputs. 
Economies with domestic content requirements in place behave dif- 
ferently, when faced with a terms-of-trade change, than do economies 
where tariffs or quotas are implemented. Furthermore, the difference 
depends on whether the requirements are imposed in terms of physical 
units or value added. First consider the case of  a domestic content 
requirement denominated in physical units. Substitute equation  (1) into 
equation (3.DCP) to write 
(17)  kXi = f(V,,L,). 
Now  require  that the marginal  revenue product of labor be equated 
across tiers, that is, combine equations (5)  and (7.DCP) to write 
(18) 
Finally, equation (8.DCP) is reproduced here as equation (19) for the 
reader's convenience: 
PfdVl,L,) = gAV0,L -  L,X). 
(19)  kP  + (1 - k)P* = g,(Vo,L - L1,X;). 
Now equations (17)-(19) constitute a system of three equations in the 
unknowns P, LI,  and X;.  The usual methods verify that the derivative 
of each of these variables with respect to P'  is negative. The negative 
correlation between the domestic input price and the world input price 
contrasts with the positive correlation between them under a tariff and 
the absence of  correlation  between them under a  quota. The same 
pattern holds for the correlation between the amount of labor employed 
in the input tier (and hence, the level of input production) and the world 
input  price.  By contrast, the correlation  between input use and  the 
world input price is the same as under a tariff. These results are sum- 
marized in table 8.1. 
To gain some intuition consider figure 8.1, which illustrates two pro- 
duction possibility frontiers. The outer production possibility frontier 240  Val Eugene Lambson 
Table 8.1  Some Effects of Terms-of-Trade Changes 
GPlSP*  SL,ISP*  SXFlSP* 
-  Tariff  +  + 
Quota  0  0  0 
Domestic content  -  -  - 




describes  the  production  set given the  level of  inputs (foreign and 
domestic) employed in the output tier before a price change. Suppose 
the economy produces at point A on that frontier. When P" rises, the 
level of  inputs used  in  the economy declines. The inner production 
possibility frontier describes the production set of the economy given 
the lower level of inputs. If the same level of inputs were produced as 
before, then production would occur at point B and the domestic price 
of inputs, as reflected in the slope of the inner frontier, would be lower. 
However, if the level of inputs used falls, and if equation (3.DCP) holds 
with equality as assumed, use of  domestically produced  inputs must 
fall proportionally.  So production actually  occurs at a point  like C, 
yielding a domestic price of inputs that is lower still. Hence there are 
I 
Fig. 8.1  Domestic content, physical units 241  Trade Restraints and World Market Conditions 
two effects. First, since fewer produced inputs are used, the economy 
is comparatively less able to produce outputs. Second, since the ratio 
of domestically produced inputs to total inputs is constant, fewer inputs 
are produced at home. Both of these effects work in the same direction, 
resulting in a fall in P. 
When the domestic content requirement is defined in terms of value 
added, the economy behaves  differently  once again.  For that case, 
combine equations (5)  and (7.DCV) to write 
Substitute equation (1) into equation (3.DCV) to write 
(21) 
Finally, equation (8.DCV) is reproduced here as equation (22) for the 
reader's convenience: 
(22) 
Now equations (20)-(22) are a system of three equations in the variables 
P, X;, and L,.  Dividing (20) by (22) eliminates P: 
P*[XI -  f(V,,L,)l  = (1 -  j)Xo. 
P = {I  + (1 -  j)[(P  -  P*)/P]}g,(V,,L - L,,Xi). 
(23)  f2(V11L/) = g2(VojL -  L/X;)/g,(Vo,L - L/X;)- 
Now equations (21) and (23) are a rather tractable two-equation system 
in L,  and Xi  that can be used to show that dLIIdP* > 0 and dX;'/dP' < 0. 
So, although an increase in the world  price causes a decrease in the 
use of inputs  just as it does when domestic content is counted in phys- 
ical units, it causes an increase in the domestic production of inputs. 
The intuition  is as follows. When P* rises, the same level of foreign 
input use would violate the constraint (3.DCV). Hence there is a ten- 
dency for substitution away from imported inputs and into domestically 
produced inputs. Of course, the higher world price causes a decrease 
in the total derived demand for inputs. Nevertheless, the net effect is 
for the production of domestically produced inputs to rise. 
To derive  the sign of  dP/dP* when domestic content requirements 
are  denominated  in  value-added  terms,  the  three-equation  system 
(20)-(22)  can be differentiated and the resulting system solved for dPl 
dP'. That exercise yields a sign for dPldP'  which appears to be ambig- 
uous. Some insight can be gained from figure 8.2  where, as before, the 
outer and inner production possibility frontiers describe the economy's 
production set given the level of inputs employed in the economy before 
and after an increase in the world price, respectively. As before, the 
decrease in the level of inputs used causes the production possibility 
frontier  to rotate in. However, now labor flows into the input tier. Hence 
the two effects work in opposite directions. (In the Cobb-Douglas case 
considered in section 8.3, dP/dP* is positive.) A note of caution is in 242  Val  Eugene Lambson 
I 
Fig. 8.2  Domestic content, value added 
order as to the use of figure 8.2. While in figure 8.1 the slope of  the 
production  possibility frontier reflects the domestic price  ratio, the 
same does not hold for figure 8.2. (These two facts can be seen from 
equations  (5) and  (7.DCP)  and  from  equations  (5) and  (7.DCV), 
respectively.) 
8.3  A Simulation 
To  get  some  idea  of  the  magnitude  of  the  effects  described  in 
section 8.2, consider a simple economy  possessing  a Cobb-Douglas 
technology in each tier, so that the production functions are given by 
(24)  X, = FL:V:-",  and 
(25)  Xo = GL$(X;')P?Vol-Pl-Pz 
For the purposes of the numerical example that follows, values for the 
parameters of equations (24) and (25) were derived from the 1977 input- 
output tables published by the Survey of  Current Business. Attention 
was focused on the industries comprising the first seventy-nine columns 
of those tables. It is unfortunate for the purposes of this chapter that 
the disaggregation in the tables is not on the basis of intermediate and 
final  products; in  each industry  some of  the production  is of  inter- 
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for each industry, i, total intermediate demand and total final demand 
are given. For the purposes of this example, assume that all imports 
reported in the input-output tables are of  intermediate goods. Let 
be the fraction of output in each industry  that is attributed to inter- 
mediate demand. Though imperfect, +;  will be used as a measure of 
the fraction of value added in industry i that resulted from intermediate 
goods production. Multiplication of value added in each industry, i, by 
+; and summation over all industries yield a measure of the total pro- 
duction of intermediate goods, XI.  Similarly, multiplication  of value 
added in each industry, i, by (1 - 4;)  and summation  over all industries 
yield a measure of the total production of final goods, X,.  The input- 
output tables also give wages and other factor payments in each in- 
dustry but, once again, do not divide them between intermediate and 
final good production. Multiplication of these figures by +; and (1 - +;) 
and summation over industries yield estimates, in dollar units, of  how 
much labor and “other factors” (to be interpreted as immobile specific 
factors) are used in the input tier and in the output tier, respectively. 
That is, these calculations yield estimates of V,,  Vo, L,, and Lo. Con- 
sistent with the earlier assumption that all imports are of intermediate 
goods, assume that input use in the economy is Xi = X,  + &mi.  These 
estimates can then be used to derive the factor shares, a,  p,,  and pz. 
Plugging all of these results  into equations (24) and (25) determines 
values for F and G.  The resulting values of a,  PI,  P2. L, V,, Vo,  F, and 
G are to be found near the bottom of table 8.2. 
Consider a small,  undistorted economy with production  functions 
and factor endowments as derived above and listed  near the bottom 
of table 8.2. Table 8.2 also reports the values of input production, X,, 
input consumption, X),  output production, Xo, output consumption, 
Table 8.2  The Undistorted Economy 
.I  .04 
.2  .12 
.3  .22 
.4  .33 
.5  .44 
.6  .54 
.7  .63 
a = .53 
















PI = .29 







I  .85 
G  = 3.36 
,005  .76 
.03  .77 
.I0  .78 
.22  .81 
.41  .86 
.66  .92 
.99  .99 
~~  ~ 
Norrs: Value of X,, Xf,  X,,  X$. L, V,, and V, are in trillions of dollars. Rounding is to 
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XL, domestic content in  physical  units,  k, and domestic content in 
value-added terms, j,  for such an economy facing world prices ranging 
from .I to .7. Note that if  world input prices exceed .7 by very much, 
the country will export inputs instead of importing them. 
Table 8.3 reports the results of imposing an ad valorem tariff on the 
input tier for three different world prices. For the different world prices 
and different tariff rates the first five columns report the equilibrium 
levels of input production, input consumption, output production, out- 
put consumption (i.e., welfare), and domestic price, respectively. The 
final column reports the elasticity of labor employment in the input tier 
with respect to a change in the world price of the input. The elasticity 
of the domestic input price with respect to the world input price is, of 
course, always one by equation (3.T).  The welfare costs of imposing 
an ad valorem tariff are easily determined from the table. For example, 
when  the world  price  is  .4, domestic welfare  without  a  tariff  (i.e., 
XL  when (1 + t) = 1) is $2.0 trillion. If a 25 percent tariff is imposed, 
this figure falls to $1.98 trillion. 
It is well known that given perfectly competitive  markets without 
distortions there is an equivalent quota for every tariff. As argued in 
section 8.2, however, economies with different policies in place will 
behave differently when faced with terms-of-trade changes. Table 8.4 
reports the elasticities of equilibrium output consumption for different 
Table 8.3  Ad Valorem Tariffs 
P*  =  .2 
(I+t)= 1.0 
(I +t)= 1.5 
(I+?)=  2.0 
(I+t)= 2.5 
(I+?)=  3.0 
(I+?)=  3.5 
(I+?)=  1.00 
(I +t)= 1.25 
(I+t)=  1.50 
(I+f)=  1.75 
(I+t)= 1.00 
(I+?)=  1.05 
(I+t)= 1.10 
(I +?)=  1.15 
P*  =  .4 
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Table 8.4  Welfare Effects of Terms-of-Trade Changes 
qx6  (Ad Valorem  q  (Specific 
Tariff)  xo Tariff)  T~;, (Quota) 
P*  = .2 
P  = .2  -  .30  -  .30  -  .30 
P  = .3  -  .32  -  .27  -  .17 
P  = .4  -  .37  -  .24  -.I0 
P  =  .5  -  .47  -  .22  -  .06 
P  = .6  -  .61  -  .22  -  .03 
P  = .I  -  .81  -  .23  -  ,001 
P*  = .4 
P  = .4 
P  =  .5 
P  = .6 
P  = .7 
-  .23 
-  .27 
-  .36 
-  .49 
P*  = .6 
P  = .6  -  .09 
P  = .63  -.I1 
P  = .66  -.13 
P  = .69  -.I5 
-  .23  -  .23 
-  .24  -.I3 
-  .26  -  .06 
-  .28  -  ,002 
-  .09  -  .09 
-  .10  ~  .06 
-.12  -  .03 
-.13  -  .01 
world prices and different levels of protection when protection takes 
the form of  an ad  valorem  tariff,  a  specific tariff,  or a quota. The 
domestic prices in  the first column refer to the domestic prices that 
result from the protection, whatever its form. For example, the first 
row in the section headed P* = .2 reports that when no protection is 
imposed, that  is, when  P  = .2, the elasticity  of  equilibrium output 
consumption is -  .30. The second row of the same section reports that 
when the domestic price is increased to .3 then the elasticity is -  .32 
if protection is by an ad valorem tariff, -  .27 if protection is by a specific 
tariff, and -  .17 if  protection is by a quota. 
Table 8.4 indicates that the welfare effects of terms-of-trade changes 
are of  greatest  magnitude under  ad  valorem  tariffs  and  of  smallest 
magnitude under quotas. The intuition follows from the analysis in 
section 8.2. When a quota is in place, changes in the world price of 
the input do not cause any reallocation of productive resources in the 
economy. An increase in that price reduces welfare only by increasing 
the price that the country must pay for its fixed level of imports. Given 
a tariff, however, an increase in the world price induces labor to flow 
into the input tier, where the country is at a comparative disadvantage. 
This intensifies the welfare loss relative to the quota case. Finally, note 
that the magnitudes of welfare changes are greater under an ad valorem 
tariff than  under a specific tariff. This is because the specific tariff, 246  Val  Eugene Lambson 
being a per unit tax, becomes proportionally less important when prices 
rise than does an ad valorem tariff. 
Table 8.5 reports the effects of terms-of-trade changes when domestic 
content requirements are imposed in physical units. The first five col- 
umns are as in table 8.3;  the last three columns report the elasticities of 
the domestic price, labor employment in the input tier, and output con- 
sumption, respectively, with respect to changes in the world price of 
inputs. Note that the elasticity of the domestic price of inputs with re- 
spect to the world price of inputs can be significant: when P'  = .2 and 
k  =  .I, for example, qp  = -  1. Table 8.6  reports similar results for do- 
mestic content requirements denominated in value-added terms. Since 
domestic content requirements are not, by themselves, equivalent to 
tariffs, direct comparisons of welfare elasticities are not as meaningful 
as they are in table 8.4. Nevertheless, if  one makes the comparison in 
terms of domestic prices it appears that the welfare effects of terms-of- 
trade changes are smaller under quotas than under domestic content leg- 
islation. For example, in table 8.5 with P*  = .2, elasticities range from 
-  .24 to -  .01 for protection that yields domestic prices from .46 to .71, 
Table 8.5  Domestic Content in Physical Units 
P*  = .2 
k  =  .I  .31 
k  = .2  .4S 
k  = .3  .51 
k  = .4  .S5 
k  = .5  .S8 
k  = .6  .SY 
k  =  .7  .61 
k  = .8  .62 
k  =  .Y  .63 
k  = .3  .40 
k  = .4  .47 
k  = .5  .S2 
k  = .6  .55 
k  = .7  .58 
k  = .8  .60 
k  =  .Y  .62 
k  = .7  .S5 
k  = .8  .58 
k  = .9  .61 
P*  = .4 













































































-  1.00 
-  .s2 
-  .32 
-  .21 
-  .I4 
-.I0 
-  .07 
-  .04 
-  .02 
-  .6Y 
-  .46 
-  .31 
-  .21 
-.I4 
-  .08 
-  .04 
-  .21 
-.I2 
-  .05 
-  1.30 
-  .64 
-  .38 
-  .25 
-  .  I6 
-.11 
-  .07 
-  .04 
-  .02 
-  .85 
-  .56 
-  .37 
-  .24 
-  .I6 
-  .OY 
-  .04 
-  .24 
-  .I4 
-  .06 
-  .24 
-.16 
-.11 
-  .08 
-  .06 
-  .04 
-  .03 
-  .02 
-  .01 
-  .lY 
-.14 
-.11 
-  .08 
-  .05 
-  .03 
-  .O1 
-  .07 
-  .05 
-  .02 
Notes: Values ofX,, XF,  X,,  and X$  are  in trillions of dollars. Rounding is to two decimal 
places. 247  Trade Restraints and World Market Conditions 
Table 8.6  Domestic Content in Value-Added Terms 
P*  = .2 
j  = .8 
j  = ,825 
j  = .850 
j  = ,875 
j  = .90 
j  = .925 
j  = ,950 
j  =  ,975 
j  =  .825 
j  = 250 
j  =  ,875 
j  =  .9 
j  =  ,925 
j  =  ,950 
j  =  ,975 
j  =  ,925 
j  =  ,950 
j  =  ,975 
P*  = .4 































































































































-  .30 
-  .29 
-  .28 
-  .26 
-  .24 
-  .20 
-  .15 
-  .08 
-  .22 




-  .08 
-  .04 
-  .08 
~  .06 
-  .03 
Nores: Values of X,, XF,  X,,  and X$ are in trillions of dollars. Rounding is to two decimal 
places. 
while in table 8.4 with P*  = .2, elasticities range from -  .10 to -  .001 
for quotas resulting in domestic prices from .4 to.7. 
8.4  Concluding Remarks 
The simulation in section 8.3 reports the comparative statics effects 
of world price changes on a small open economy when producers of 
all  intermediate goods  are protected.  Obviously, as both  Dixit  and 
Grossman assert in their comments on this chapter, in the more likely 
event that less sweeping measures are considered, one would want to 
focus on  the particular  industries in  question.  Of  course, a careful 
empirical application of this theory to, for example, the United States 
economy would require a more complex model and more detailed data 
than were used here. The results reported in section 8.3 are best in- 
terpreted as being illustrative in nature. 
The results derived above demonstrate that, although two policies 
may be equivalent in a static sense, they may behave very differently 
in the face of changes in market conditions. Hence, if  it is difficult to 
change policies once they are in place, the criteria for choosing a policy 248  Val  Eugene Lambson 
should include how it will cause the economy to behave in the future, 
given what is likely to occur. 
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Comment  Avinash K. Dixit 
This chapter compares the performance of alternative methods of con- 
tent protection  when the world price can change after the policy has 
been fixed. This is very useful in drawing our attention to a dimension 
of “robustness”  of policy that is seldom analyzed. Major policy changes 
are infrequent, therefore, the design of policy should bear in mind its 
suitability to a variety of future circumstances where it will be in force. 
The idea should have much wider applicability, but the analysis needs 
to be taken further before it can be used in this way. 
In quite general notation, the equilibrium  of an economy is deter- 
mined given the world prices p* and policy instruments z. Let x denote 
some variable of economic interest, such as the consumption of the 
output good, or the rental rate for the specific factor in the input tier. 
Now x  is a function x(z,p*).  What  Lambson does is to compare the 
partial derivatives x2 (z,p*)  for different instruments z. What can we 
learn from this? Presumably the variable x is a maximand or a target 
of policy. If we choose z  having in mind one value of p’  and then a 
higher value emerges, then x might overshoot, or move the wrong way, 
depending on the sign of x2 (z,p*). 
This  is  not  as systematic as one would  like.  We  should  view  the 
problem as one of decision making under uncertainty.  We  must fix z 
before p* is realized, but we have a subjective or objective distribution 
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over it, and some attitude to risk about x. The simplest such problem 
would be to maximize E[U(x(z,p*))].  Another might be to maximize 
Prob {x(z,p*) > g} where g is a target level. 
If the uncertainty in p*  is small, Lambson's comparative statics will 
be a useful component of this more general analysis. Thus we have, 
approximately, 
x(z,p*) = x(z,Ep*)  + (p* - Ep*)  x2  (z,Ep*). 
Therefore 
Var[x(z,p*)l = Var[p*I . [x2 (z,Ep*)I2. 
The policymaker  can then choose z  to maximize a quadratic utility 
function over x. Alternatively, 
Prob {x(z,p*)  >  x_}  = 
Prob {p' > Ep'  +  [x_ -  x(z,Ep*)1/x2(z,Ep*)}, 
which enables us to calculate the approximate policy to ensure fulfill- 
ment of the target with maximum probability. 
Once uncertainty is made explicit, it becomes important to introduce 
markets to deal with it. Even with the aggregate or systematic uncer- 
tainty that is inherent in p', the real incomes of different factors are 
affected differently. They therefore have the desire to trade  Arrow- 
type securities whose payoff is conditional on p'.  Such markets are 
feasible since p* is easily observable. The equilibrium, and therefore 
the policy analysis,  should be  conducted  relative  to such a market 
structure . 
Turning to the specific problem of  content protection,  I  think this 
whole literature needs to distinguish two concepts: protection of  the 
input tier and protection to value added in  the output tier. When we 
think of  content protection for the automobile industry, we  mean a 
requirement  that  a greater proportion of  transmissions, chassis, en- 
gines, and so forth be of domestic manufacture, not that the industry 
use a certain proportion,  whether in physical or value terms, of do- 
mestic steel. In fact, an import tariff or quota on steel will reduce the 
effective rate of  protection to the domestic auto industry. 
Of  course, this is  in part a matter of  definition: if  auto parts are 
classified in the input tier and only the final assembly stage in the output 
tier,  content  protection  may  properly  be  modeled  as protection  of 
the input tier. Therefore, theoretical work may legitimately blur the 
distinction. However, in empirical work, an appropriate choice of def- 
initions becomes crucial.  Here Lambson's  formulation  seems unfor- 
tunate.  He assumes that all  imports  are of  intermediate goods  and 
chooses his parameter values accordingly. Now in 1984, out of a total 
of  $341  billion of  U.S. merchandise imports, $39  billion were  road 250  Val  Eugene Lambson 
vehicles (excluding parts), $14 billion were clothing and accessories, 
$5 billion were footwear, and $3.6 billion were toys and sporting goods. 
If all these goods, comprising almost 20 percent of all imports, are to 
be intermediate, the output tier must be essentially only retailing. This 
makes content protection, or protection of the input tier, virtually tan- 
tamount to general protection for manufacturing. I doubt if that is what 
most people would understand by  the term. 
In reality, what we understand by the scope of  the input and output 
tiers differs very widely across industries, depending on the extent of 
vertical integration, organization of labor, or even pure historical cus- 
tom. This leads me to think that aggregate economywide equilibrium 
models are not really the best  way to do empirical work on content 
protection. An industry-by-industry approach would allow more pre- 
cision in capturing the kind of  protection that is relevant in each con- 
text. It would also allow a more accurate specification of demand and 
cost conditions, and so improve the calculation of the efficiency and 
distributive effects of the policies. 
Comment  Gene M. Grossman 
This chapter is a fine example of the Rochester school of trade theory. 
Lambson constructs a simple, tractable general equilibrium model to 
study various trade policies that might be used to protect producers of 
intermediate inputs. Unlike much of the literature that focuses on the 
implications for resource allocation of different policies set to achieve 
some common objective, Lambson is concerned with what happens 
when policies are already in place and some external conditions change. 
In particular, he studies how changes in the terms of trade affect equi- 
librium in the domestic market when tariffs, quotas, or two types of 
content protection schemes are used to protect intermediate-goods pro- 
ducers. A main finding is that a fall in the international price of  inter- 
mediates causes the local price of intermediates to fall when a tariff is 
in effect, has no impact on domestic prices under a quota regime, and 
actually causes the local price of intermediates to rise when a physical 
content protection scheme is in place. 
My  remarks are in three parts. First, I provide an interpretation of 
Lambson’s results that makes use of some simple, partial equilibrium, 
supply and demand diagrams. These diagrams helped me to understand 
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the findings and also convinced me that they would survive in alter- 
native but equally reasonable specifications of the general equilibrium 
structure. Second, I argue that the general equilibrium approach per- 
haps is not the most appropriate for the question at hand, especially 
when it comes time for the empirical application presented in the last 
section of  Lambson’s chapter. Finally, I  offer some suggestions for 
possible extensions of the research reported here. 
Interpretation of Results 
The theoretical  portion of Lambson’s chapter stresses that foreign 
price changes will have qualitatively different effects on the domestic 
intermediate goods market when different policies are used to protect 
that industry. This point is seen most clearly, I believe, when we con- 
sider how the net  derived demand curve for domestic intermediates 
shifts in  response to the terms-of-trade change under the alternative 
policies. In figure (28.1, I have shown the equilibrium in the domestic 
market for locally produced intermediate goods under a tariff regime. 
The curve labeled DD’ is the total derived demand for intermediates 
by domestic final-goods manufacturers, and SS’ is the supply of inter- 
mediates by  local producers.  Under a tariff, imports are available in 
perfectly elastic supply at the tariff-augmented international price, so 
initially the net (or residual) derived demand for the domestic input is 
given by ACD’. When the world price of imported intermediates falls 
to p;, the net derived demand shifts to A‘C’D’,  causing the domestic 
price  to fall  to p,*(l + t).  As  is  well  known,  incipient  substitution 
toward imports causes demand for the domestic product to fall, thereby 
exerting downward pressure on the local price. 
PRICE 
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Contrast this result with that for a quota, illustrated in figure C8.2. 
Here the net demand curve at the initial world price of foreign inter- 
mediates is given by ABCD’. This curve is found by subtracting from 
total demand DD‘ the fixed amount of the quota, BC, for all domestic 
prices exceeding the world price of intermediates. Now when the world 
price falls to pl*,  the net demand for domestic intermediates becomes 
AB’C’D’. As is clear from this figure, this shift has no effect on the 
equilibrium price of  the domestic product. The reason, of  course, is 
that substitution toward the now cheaper import is not possible when 
the quota is binding, so the fall in p* induces no change in demand. 
Next consider the case of a physical content protection scheme (PCP). 
In  Grossman (1981) I  described the construction  of  the net derived 
demand curve associated with this policy instrument, as depicted in 
figure C8.3. To review briefly, a PCP requires domestic manufacturers 
to use at least a specified proportion  1 - k of domestic intermediates 
(relative to imported intermediates) in their production processes. Again 
let DD’ be the total demand for intermediates by domestic manufac- 
turers, and note that this curve is drawn as a function of the effective 
price of  an intermediate good faced by the final-goods sector. As an 
intermediate step, we construct the curve labeled DE by  finding all 
quantities that are a fraction 1 -  k of total demand along DD’. Then, 
the relevant portion of the net derived demand curve is found by ver- 
tically displacing DE, so that a weighted average of the domestic price 
on the net derived demand curve and the (given) international price p* 
(with 1 - k and k as the weights) gives the corresponding price on the 
curve DE. Take the point X, for example. When the domestic price is 
given by the ordinate of this point, the weighted average of the domestic 
Fig. CS.2  Quota protection 
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Fig. C8.3  Content protection 
and foreign price is given by  the ordinate of  Y,  on DE. This is the 
effective price of  intermediates faced by domestic manufacturers, so 
total demand is given by the abscissa of  Z on DD’. But then the PCP 
requires that  at least a fraction  1 -  k  of this amount be purchased 
domestically. By construction, this quantity is given by the abscissa of 
Y and hence X. (Note that the complete net derived demand curve is 
given by ABCD’, where the policy is not binding along BCD’.) 
When the international price falls top,*,  the net demand curve shifts 
to A’B’C’D‘. This increase in demand  in the relevant region causes 
the domestic price to rise, thus confirming Lambson’s result. How do 
we account for this finding? Because the PCP requires that imported 
and domestic inputs be used in fixed proportions, the two intermediate 
goods become complements, rather than substitutes, when the policy 
is in effect. The fall in p*  induces domestic manufacturers of final goods 
to expand their production.  Substitution between  the  intermediates 
does not  take place, but  the  “output  effect”  implies an increase in 
demand for the domestic product. 
Finally, consider the value-added content scheme (VACP). Here there 
are two effects working in opposite directions. The fall in p* means 
that more foreign intermediates can be imported without the content 
constraint being violated. Hence, substitution of imported for domestic 
intermediates takes place. At the same time, because the fall inp*  eases 
the constraint, local final-goods producers have an incentive to expand 
their outputs by purchasing more inputs of all kinds. Evidently, the net 254  Val  Eugene Lambson 
impact of the output and substitution effects is ambiguous, as Lambson 
has shown. 
General versus Partial Equilibrium Modeling 
As should be clear from the logic of the discussion, Lambson’s the- 
oretical results would survive in many alternative general equilibrium 
models to the one he chooses. But where the theory is robust to model 
specification, the empirical calibration is not likely to be so. In practice, 
content protection always is applied at the level of a specific industry 
and enforced on a firm-by-firm basis. Indeed, it is hard to imagine what 
would be meant by an economywide content protection scheme. Are 
we to imagine that  the economy as a whole is to achieve a certain 
average domestic content? If  so, how would such a scheme be imple- 
mented? If the content requirement is to apply to each and every firm, 
surely the constraint would have differential impacts across sectors. 
The general equilibrium structure forces Lambson to treat all imports 
as intermediates. While he justifies this approach with appeal to the 
notion of “middle products” as developed by Sanyal and Jones (1982), 
it is hard to imagine how French wine could be made to conform to a 
60 percent domestic content requirement, even after allowance is made 
for domestic value added in packaging and retailing. 
An alternative approach would have been to follow the partial equi- 
librium modeling outlined above. Then, detailed consideration could 
have been given to each of two or three industries for which content 
protection has been proposed. While some points of  detail would be 
different  (there would  be  no  need  to have balanced  trade between 
intermediates and final goods at the industry level), the general message 
would have been preserved and the numbers would have been more 
informative. 
Extensions of the Research 
Given the evident inertia in the policy-setting apparatus, the question 
raised by Lambson of the “robustness”  of trade policy to a changing 
economic environment is an important one. Lambson’s work might be 
fruitfully extended using the following general  approach. First, one 
could state explicitly the assumed objective of trade policy. Next, the 
various instruments that might be used to achieve that objective would 
be  identified. The policy control variables  then  would be  set at the 
levels needed to achieve the objective. Finally, shocks to the environ- 
ment are introduced, and implications for domestic welfare are com- 
pared. The approach could apply not only to changes in the terms of 
trade, but also to shifts in domestic supply and demand  conditions. 
This would provide an additional basis for ranking policies beyond the 255  Trade Restraints and World Market Conditions 
usual, static, deadweight-loss measures: which policy will cause least 
harm if  conditions change before the policymakers  have a chance to 
act again? 
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